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Abstract
We describe how to verify security properties of C code for crypto-
graphic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security
theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography. Our techniques include:
use of ghost state to attach formal algebraic terms to concrete byte arrays
and to detect collisions when two distinct terms map to the same byte ar-
ray; decoration of a crypto API with contracts based on symbolic terms;
and expression of the attacker model in terms of C programs. We rely on
the general-purpose verifier VCC; we guide VCC to prove security simply
by writing suitable header files and annotations in implementation files,
rather than by changing VCC itself. We formalize the symbolic model in
Coq in order to justify the addition of axioms to VCC.
1 Introduction
Economies of scale suggest that it is better, where possible, to adapt an exist-
ing general-purpose tool to a specialist problem, than to go to the expense of
building a specialist tool for each niche application area.
Our particular concern is the specialist problem of verifying the implementa-
tion code of cryptographic protocols [38, 37, 16]. This code is mostly written in
C, and is often the first—and sometimes the only—completely precise descrip-
tion of the message formats and invariants of cryptographic protocols. Hence,
reasoning about such code offers a way to find and prevent both the design and
implementation flaws that lead to expensive failures (for instance, [21, 51, 49]).
Background: Proving Cryptographic Protocol Code The prior work on
verifying C code of security protocols relies on special-purpose tools. Csur [38]
analyzes C code for secrecy properties via a custom abstract interpretation,
while ASPIER [22] relies on security-specific software model-checking tech-
niques, obtaining good results on the main loop of OpenSSL. Both these tools
use the symbolic model of cryptography introduced by Dolev and Yao [31].
More recently, symbolic execution was used to extract partial models from C
programs, translating them into ProVerif processes that can be verified [4]. For
some of these models, computational soundness results can be used to obtain
security theorems in the computational model of cryptography for a single path
of the C program, identified by dynamic execution. In subsequent work [5], the
translation and model are adapted slightly, to produce CryptoVerif models for
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direct verification in the computational model. However, the limitation to a
single path is still present.
Another line of work considers the problem of verifying reference imple-
mentations written as functional programs. Initial approaches rely on security-
specific analyzers. The tools FS2PV [16] and FS2CV [36] translate functional
programs in F# to the process calculi accepted by the specialised verifiers
ProVerif [18] and CryptoVerif [19] for automatic verification in the symbolic
and computational models; an implementation of TLS [14] is a substantial case
study.
Instead of translating to a protocol verifier, the typechecker F7 [13] checks
F# by using security-specific refinement types, types qualified with formulas,
to express security properties. The theory of F7 is based on the symbolic
model, although in some circumstances F7 can be adapted to the computa-
tional model [9, 34].
A subsequent, more flexible, method of using refinement types, based on
invariants for cryptographic structures [15], relies on axiomatizations of crypto-
graphic predicates (such as which data is public); first implemented for F7, the
method works in principle with any general-purpose refinement-type checker.
The method has been ported to F* [57], a recent functional language.
Our strategy is to port this method to a verifier for C.
Background: General-Purpose C Verifiers By now there are several
general-purpose and more-or-less automatic verification tools for C, including
Frama-C [29], VeriFast [41], and VCC [24]. This paper describes our techniques
for guiding one of these, VCC, to verify a range of security protocol implemen-
tations. Although we adopt VCC, we expect our method would port to other
tools.
VCC verifies C code against specifications written as conventional function
contracts, that is, pre, post, and frame conditions. It translates C to an inter-
mediate verifier, Boogie [11], which itself relies on an SMT solver, Z3 [30]. The
translation to Boogie encodes an accurate low-level memory model for C. VCC
supports concurrency, which we use to model distributed execution of proto-
cols as well as for multithreaded code. Specifications use ghost state, that is,
specially-marked program variables that may be mentioned in contracts, but
that are not allowed to affect ordinary state or control flow. We aim to scale to
verify large amounts of off-the-shelf C code such as OpenSSL; VCC has already
proved itself capable of verifying large pre-existing codebases [24].
1.1 Outline of our Techniques
We summarize the main aspects of our adaptation to C and VCC of the method
of invariants for cryptographic structures [15]. Later on, we describe the differ-
ences from the prior work on F# and F7.
1.1.1 Language-independent definitional theory
We develop a theory of symbolic cryptography, independent of any programming
language, within the interactive proof assistant Coq. The theory is definitional
in the sense that it is developed from sound definitional principles (on the basis
of symbolic cryptography), with no additional assumptions.
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As usual in the symbolic model [31], the core of our theory is an algebraic
type with constructors corresponding to the following: the outcomes of crypto-
graphic algorithms such as keyed hashing, encryptions, and signatures; literal
byte strings (which represent messages, principal names, keys, and nonces, etc);
and reversible pairing (used for message formatting and implemented with a
length field).
Our theory accounts for the time-dependent history of protocol execution
by defining a log, L, to be a set of events, which records progress so far in a
protocol run. Events are values of another algebraic type, for example:
• Key generation is recorded by an event such as New k (KeyAB a b),
which records that the term k represents a fresh key with usage KeyAB a b,
that is, a key shared between principals a and b. Values of the algebraic
datatype usage represent the different sorts of keys used in a protocol.
• Progress through a protocol is tracked by events such as Request a b t,
meaning that a client a has started a protocol run by sending a request t
to a server b.
• Principal compromise is recorded using an event such as Bad a, meaning
that principal a, and its keys, are under the control of the attacker.
Our theory also includes an inductive definition of confidentiality levels of
terms, parameterized by the log of events. We borrow the High/Low terminol-
ogy from the information-flow literature, although we give them a related, but
different, meaning, reminiscent of Abadi’s Any/Public security levels [1]. All
terms manipulated during a protocol run must be High, and we verify that all
terms that become known to the adversary are Low. By definition, every Low
term is also High. A term is said to be secret if it is not Low. We need to
parameterize by the log because once events such as a principal compromise are
logged, more data becomes public (such as keys known to the principal).
1.1.2 Theory imported as first-order axioms
C is a low-level language and does not directly support abstractions for alge-
braic types. Also, VCC cannot easily perform the more complex proofs by
induction, being based on first-order logic and having only limited support for
induction principles. Moreover, performing the security proof in Coq allows us,
in theory, to re-use a protocol description and proof of security for different
implementations, written in different languages or verified using different tools.
We therefore use VCC inductive datatypes and functions to define the types of
terms, key usages, events and logs, as well as basic predicates on these types,
but still import the definition of the Level predicate and related theorems as
first-order axioms. The adversary only directly manipulates concrete C data,
and cannot (for example) pattern match encryption terms to extract the key
or payload. Results proved by VCC hold in all models of the axioms, including
the intended one inductively defined as the Level predicate in Coq.
1.1.3 A ghost table relates bytestrings and symbolic terms
To simplify the example, our cryptographic library manipulates byte arrays via
a C struct bytes c, which contains a length field together with a pointer to a
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heap-allocated chunk of memory with that length. Additionally, the struct con-
tains a ghost field encoding, that has the type bytes of mathematical bytestring
values, satisfying an invariant that it encodes the actual bytestring stored in
memory. We maintain a global ghost variable CS, which represents the crypto-
graphic state, composed of both the log, and a representation table. The latter
holds a finite one-to-one correspondence betweeen symbolic terms and the cryp-
tographically significant bytestrings arising so far in the run. The predicate
CS.T.DefinedB[b] holds just if bytestring b exists in the table. If so, CS.T.B2T[b] is
the corresponding term. Conversely, if term t is in the table, CS.T.T2B[t] is the
corresponding bytestring.
We rely on the table to write VCC function contracts that specify symbolic
assumptions about concrete cryptographic routines. For example, the contract
for hmacsha1 follows. It enforces that tb can be MAC’ed with tk only when the
protocol-dependent precondition canHmac(tk, tb) holds in the current log CS.L.
int hmacsha1(bytes c ∗k, bytes c ∗b, bytes c ∗res)
(requires CS.T.DefinedB[k−>encoding])
(requires CS.T.DefinedB[b−>encoding])
(ensures !\result ⇒CS.T.DefinedB[res−>encoding])
(requires
canHmac(CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding],CS.L))
(ensures !\result ⇒
CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding] ==
Hmac(CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding]));
The contract’s first three lines express the precondition (using the requires
keyword) that the two concrete arguments are in the table, and the postcon-
dition (using the ensures keyword) that the concrete result is in the table. The
fourth line requires that the canHmac predicate is fulfilled by the input terms in
the current log. The final line ensures that the term associated with the result
is Hmac(tk, tb), where terms tk and tb are associated with the concrete inputs.
(As this contract illustrates, the inclusion of ghost field encoding in bytes c allows
succinct access in specifications to the contents of memory.)
The VCC-verified concrete implementation of hmacsha1, called a hybrid wrap-
per, simply calls a routine trusted to compute the MAC of the inputs, and then
in ghost code updates the table with the result, if it is new.
1.1.4 Protocol roles described as ordinary C code
Each role of a protocol is simply code in C, executed as normal, and verified
for memory safety and security with VCC. We model distributed execution by
multiple threads that communicate concretely by message passing via a network
API, but that share a single cryptographic state. The protocol code can itself
be multithreaded and use shared memory, but that feature is not used in the
simple examples presented here.
Throughout this article, we take as a running example the following simple
authenticated RPC protocol (introduced in [15]). This two-party protocol uses a
pre-shared secret key to authenticate requests and responses and link responses
to the corresponding request, using a keyed hash as MAC.
Running example: an authenticated RPC protocol
a : Log(Request(a, b, payload))
a → b: payload | hmac(kab, ”1” | payload)
b : assert(Request(a, b, payload))
4
b : Log(Response(a, b, payload, payload’))
b → a: payload’ | hmac(kab, ”2” | payload | payload’)
a : assert(Response(a, b, payload, payload’))
The narration logs events marking a’s intent to send a request, and b’s
intent to send a response. At these points in our code, ghost commands add
events to the log. The narration also includes correspondence assertions marking
b’s conclusion that a has sent a request, and a’s conclusion that b has sent a
response. In our code, these correspondences become assert statements, to be
verified by VCC.
1.1.5 Attacker model expressed using C interface
We prove protocol code secure against a network-based attacker [50], rather than
against say local malware. We consider an attacker to be a C program consisting
simply of a series of calls to functions in the attacker interface. In keeping with
the symbolic model, the attacker cannot directly manipulate bytestrings using
the bitwise operators of C, but only via this interface. It includes functions for
cryptography, to send and receive network messages, to create new principals
(but without access to their keys), to create instances of protocol roles, and to
cause the compromise of principals (after which their keys are available). The
addition of explicit compromise allows us to reason about properties that may
hold even after some keys become public. For example, when multiple parallel
sessions are concerned, it is desirable that a compromise in one of them does not
affect security properties in the others. Since our security results hold in spite
of an arbitrary attacker, we place no bound on the number of distinct principals
or concurrent sessions.
1.1.6 Security theorems obtained via a general-purpose verifier
By running VCC on the protocol implementation, we prove both correspon-
dence properties, expressing authentication and integrity properties, and weak
secrecy properties. As mentioned, correspondences amount to embedded assert
statements. Standard symbolic cryptography assumptions are expressed using
local assume statements. Weak secrecy properties amount to consequences of
invariants, respected by all verified code. A typical secrecy property can be
explained as follows: if k is a key shared between a and b and k is public,
then either principal a or principal b is compromised. Proof with VCC is semi-
automatic in that it relies on automatic deductive inference, but with the help
of user-supplied annotations.
1.2 Contributions of the Paper
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first published verification methodol-
ogy for C implementations of cryptographic protocols that proves both memory
safety and security properties for unbounded sessions. Csur [38, 39] proves se-
crecy properties, but does not show memory safety; in fact, verification succeeds
despite the example code allowing accidental access to uninitialized memory.
ASPIER [22] proves various security properties by software model-checking, but
verification considers only a few concurrent sessions, and relies on substantial
abstractions.
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Our work takes the idea of invariants for cryptographic structures [15] away
from strongly-typed functional programming in F# and F7, and recasts it in the
setting of a weakly-typed low-level imperative language. In C we can neither
rely on abstract types nor escape from the difficulties of reasoning about mutable
memory and aliasing. These are probably the main new difficulties we address
compared to the prior work with F7 [15]; verifying C is much harder than
verifying F#. In return, we enjoy vastly wider applicability, as the bulk of
production cryptographic protocols is in C. A less obvious and more technical
benefit is that in F7, the log of events is implicit and its impact on inductively
defined predicates requires a bespoke notion of semantic safety for F#. By
making the log explicit in ghost state, we can work within a completely standard
semantics of assertions on C programs.
Our method forces the developer to precisely specify memory safety and
security properties. We verify them with a scalable and practically reliable tool
that has clear semantics in terms of standard C, its compilers and hardware
architecture. Since user interaction is by way of code annotation, the verification
effort may be expected to evolve well as the code base evolves. We may also hope
to reap the benefit of ongoing improvements in automation for general-purpose
verifiers for C. These improvements have already had an impact while carrying
out the work reported in this paper. Benefiting from such improvements may
mean that existing annotations need to be updated to respond to changes in
the verifier used; however, in our experience this investment is worthwhile in
terms of the performance improvements gained (in our case, the adjustments
necessitated by switching to a new version of VCC required about one person
day effort). Although we prove our security-specific theory in Coq, we do trust
the VCC/Boogie/Z3 tool chain and the C compiler.
We have validated our approach on implementations we developed, some
using our own cryptographic APIs and with easy verification in mind [33], and
some written in a more idiomatic C style involving manipulation of raw pointers
to bytestrings, inlined marshalling and unmarshalling of pairs, and using existing
cryptographic and network APIs [3]. In subsequent work [56], VCC was used
to verify security properties of existing code. The approach used is somewhat
different, as the entire proof is done in VCC, using a destructor-based definition
of the Level predicate (inspired by TAPS [23]) and a set of attacker capabilities
that is explicitly specified as a set of functions.
We improve on our previous paper by unifying the Pub and Bytes predicates
into a single, unified, Level predicate, which allows a much more general form of
cryptographic invariants and usage predicates. We also modify the implementa-
tion of those invariants and predicates in VCC to leverage both recent changes to
the verifier and lessons learned whilst using it, significantly improving the per-
formance of our method by letting the automated tool optimize the axioms, and
also improving the potential for debugging the specification by type-checking.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
We verify the following stack of C program files, listed in dependency order,
which link to form an executable.
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crypto.h/c library: crypto, malloc, etc (not verified)
RPCdefs.h representation table, event log
RPChybrids.h/c hybrid wrappers
RPCprot.h/c protocol roles, setup
RPCshim.h/c network attacker interface
RPCattack 0.c sample attack / application
Section 2 introduces features of VCC used in our treatment of symbolic cryp-
tography (the topic of Section 3, file RPCdefs.h, along with a Coq theory RPCdefs.v)
and its connection to concrete data (the topic of Section 4, files RPChybrids.h and
RPChybrids.c). Section 5 states our assumptions about VCC. Section 6 models
symbolic attacks as programs (e.g., RPCattack 0.c) using an API RPCshim.h. Sec-
tion 7 states and proves safety of an example protocol implementation (RPCprot.h
and RPCprot.c). Section 8 summarizes our results including verification of other
examples. Section 9 covers related work. Section 10 concludes with remarks on
limitations and future work.
This article is based on a conference paper [33], together with some material
extracted from a subsequent paper [3]. The updated source files are online at
http://fdupress.net/files/journals/guiding/JCS-code.zip.
2 Background on the VCC Verifier
VCC uses an automatic theorem prover to statically check correctness of C
code with respect to specifications written as function contracts and other an-
notation comments. The tool is based on a precise model of multithreaded,
shared-memory executions of C programs. In order to verify rich functional
specifications without the need for interactive theorem proving and yet scaling
to industrial software using idiomatic C, VCC relies on a somewhat intricate
methodology for specifications. This section sketches pertinent features of the
model and methodology. Section 5 describes more precisely the way in which our
security results rely on VCC. For details that are glossed over here, see [24, 25]
and the tool documentation. We expect the reader is familiar with C syntax
such as macro definitions (#define) and record declarations (typedef struct).
VCC’s semantics of C is embodied in its verification condition generator
(VCG), which works by translating annotated C source code to a relatively
simple intermediate language (BoogiePL) which itself is equipped with a VCG.
The translation is procedure-modular, that is, each C function body b is verified
separately; function calls are interpreted by inlining their specifications. The
VCG reflects a reasoning methodology that includes memory safety and locally
checked invariants. The VCG models preemptive multithreading by interpreting
code in terms of its atomic steps, between each of which there may be arbitrary
interference on shared state, constrained only by invariants associated with data
types declared in the program as explained later. Atomicity is with respect to
sequentially consistent hardware and data types like integers with atomic read
and write. (The methodology has been adapted to reasoning about a weaker
memory model, Total Store Order, but that has not yet been implemented in
VCC [27].)
Memory blocks are arrays of bytes, but a typed view is imposed in order
to simplify reasoning while catering for idiomatic C and standard compilers.
The verifier attempts to associate a type with each pointer dereferenced by the
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program, and imposes the requirement that distinct pointers reference separate
parts of memory. For example two integers cannot partially overlap. Structs
may nest as fields inside other structs, in accord with the declared struct types,
but distinct values do not otherwise overlap. Annotations can specify, however,
the re-interpretation of an int as an array of bytes, changing the typestate of a
union, and so forth.
The declaration of a struct type can be annotated with an invariant: a for-
mula that refers to fields of an instance this. (We often say “invariant” for what
is properly called a “type invariant”.) Invariants need not hold of uninitialized
objects, so there is a boolean ghost field that designates whether the object is
open or closed : in each reachable state, every closed object should satisfy the
invariant associated with its type. Ghost state is disjoint from the concrete state
that exists at runtime; syntactic restrictions ensure that it cannot influence con-
crete state. This standard technique appears as “auxiliary variables” in [54], as
in Assumption 2 in Section 5.
Useful invariants often refer to more than one object, but the point of as-
sociating invariants with objects is to facilitate local reasoning: when a field is
written, the verifier only needs to check the invariants of relevant objects, ow-
ing to admissibility conditions that VCC imposes on invariants. Invariants and
other specifications designate an ownership hierarchy: if object o1 owns o2 then
the invariant of o1 may refer to the state of o2 and thus must be maintained by
updates of o2. The state of a thread is modeled by a ghost object. An object is
wrapped if it is owned by the current thread (object) and closed. The owner of
an object is recorded in a ghost field. VCC provides notations unwrap and wrap
to open/close an object, with wrap also asserting the invariant.
Ownership makes manifest that the invariant for one object o1 may depend
on fields of another object o2, so the VCG can check o1’s invariant when o2
is updated. Since hierarchical ownership is inadequate for shared objects like
locks, VCC provides another way to make manifest that o1 depends on the
state of o2: it allows that o1 maintains a claim on o2—a ghost object with no
concrete state but an invariant that depends on o2. Declaring a type to be
claimable introduces implicit ghost state used by the VCG to track outstanding
claims. The ghost code to create a claim or store it in a field is part of the
annotation provided by the programmer.
The term invariant encompasses two-state predicates for the before and after
states of a state transition. In this way, invariants serve as the rely conditions
in a form of rely-guarantee reasoning (compare [43], an early formulation of this
concept). Usually two-state invariants are written as ordinary formulas, using
the keyword old to designate expressions interpreted in the before state. We say
an invariant is one-state to mean that it does not depend on the before state.1
A thread can update an object that it owns, using unwrap and wrap. However,
in many cases (such as locks), having a single owner is too restrictive, and
another mechanism is needed to allow multiple threads to update the object
concurrently. VCC interprets fields marked volatile as being susceptible to update
by other threads, in accord with the interpretation of the volatile keyword by C
compilers. An atomic step is allowed to update a volatile field without opening
1To ensure that there is an appropriate interpretation of an invariant in a single state, one
of the admissibility conditions is that if an invariant holds for the state transition σ1 to σ2 it
also holds for the stuttering transition σ2, σ2 (which thus serves as the one-state interpretation
in σ2).
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the object, provided that the object is proved closed and the update maintains
the object’s two-state invariant (that being the interference condition on which
interleaved threads rely). The standard idiom for locks is that several threads
each maintain a claim that the lock is closed, so they may rely on its invariant;
outstanding claims prevent even the owner from unwrapping the object. Atomic
blocks are explicitly marked as such. An atomic block may make at most one
concrete update, to be sound for C semantics, but may update multiple ghost
fields. We do not use assume statements in atomic blocks.
3 Symbolic Cryptography in VCC
The original work on cryptographic invariants in F7 [15] introduces inductive
definitions simply by listing Horn clauses. In our work with VCC, we express
the symbolic algebra and its cryptographic invariants as explicit Coq definitions.
We adapt the presentation of those Coq definitions from a previous paper [3],
which introduced a more systematic representation of cryptographic invariants,
to the HMAC-based RPC example studied in this article.
This section describes a type term of symbolic cryptographic expressions,
a type log of sets of events during runs of a protocol, and a type level, either
Low or High. Given these types, we make an inductive definition of a predicate
Level l t L, meaning that the term t may arise at level l after the events in log
L have happened. The set of terms at level Low is an upper bound on any
attacker’s knowledge, while the set of terms at level High is an upper bound
on any principal’s knowledge. (The set of High terms is a strict superset of the
Low terms.) We make these definitions in the Coq proof assistant, and use it to
check security theorems. Subsequently, we import the definitions and theorems
into VCC, confident in their soundness.
We present the Coq definitions for our authenticated RPC example, along
with their encoding in VCC, which makes use of the newly implemented support
for inductive datatypes and functions. The use of datatypes lets VCC generate
first-order axioms that are much more efficient than those we wrote by hand in
prior work [33], and provides better type-checking to help debug complicated
protocol specifications.
3.1 Terms and Usages
First, we define the term type, with constructors to build literal terms from
bytestrings, to injectively pair two terms (the ·|· operation), to compute keyed
hashes, and, for generality, to perform symmetric authenticated encryption.
(To accommodate other protocols, we may extend the type with constructors
for other standard cryptographic primitives, such as asymmetric encryption and
signature.)
We define an auxiliary type usage, whose values describe the purposes of
freshly generated bytestrings of the protocol. These may be guesses gener-
ated by the attacker, or protocol keys, or nonces sent as messages to help us
specify secrecy properties. In this protocol, we only have one kind of keys for
keyed hashes, and all other usage types (nonceUsage and sencKeyUsage) are
empty. Appendix A shows the narration and usage definitions for a variant
of the Otway-Rees key exchange protocol we also verify, showing an example
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involving several distinct key usages. The inductive definitions shown in [3] for
an encryption-based variant of RPC also show nonce usages, as well as multiple
symmetric encryption key usages.
Coq and VCC definitions for terms and usages
Inductive term :=
| Literal: (bs: bytes)
| Pair: (t1 t2: term)
| Hmac: (k m: term)
| SEnc: (k p: term).
Inductive hmacKeyUsage :=
| U KeyAB: (a b: term).
Inductive usage :=
| AttackerGuess
| Nonce: nonceUsage
| HmacKey: hmacKeyUsage
| SEncKey: sencKeyUsage.
(datatype term {
case Literal(bytes)
case Pair(term,term)
case Hmac(term,term)
case SEnc(term,term) })
(datatype hmacKeyUsage {
case U KeyAB(term a, term b) })
(datatype usage {
case AttackerGuess()
case Nonce(nonceUsage u)
case HmacKey(hmacKeyUsage u)
case SEncKey(sencKeyUsage u) })
3.2 Events and Log
Next, we introduce the log type as being a set of events, where there are four
constructors of the event type: (1) an event New (Literal bs) u means that the
fresh bytestring bs has one of the usages u; (2) an event Request a b req means
that client a intends to send server b the request req; (3) an event Response a
b req resp means that server b has accepted the request req from client a and
intends to reply with response resp; (4) an event Bad p means that any key
known to principal p is compromised. We also define a predicate Good L to
mean that the New events in log L ascribe a unique usage to each nonce or key,
and apply only to bytestring literals.
In VCC, we model the type of sets using boolean maps, and set membership
is simple map application, denoted using square brackets. Functions preceded by
the def keyword must be pure terminating functions and their body is available
as an expression when verifying other functions, allowing the omission of precise
contracts, at the cost of a slight decrease in performance.
Coq and VCC definitions for events and logs
Inductive ev :=
| New: (t: term) (u: usage)
| Request: (a b req: term)
| Response: (a b req resp: term)
| Bad: (p: term).
Definition log := set event.
Definition Logged (e: ev) (L: log) :=
set In e L.
Definition log leq (L L’: log) :=
∀x, Logged x L →Logged x L’.
Definition Good (L: log) :=
(∀ t u, Logged (New t u) L →
∃bs, t = Literal bs) ∧
(∀ t u1 u2,
Logged (New t u1) L →
Logged (New t u2) L →
u1 = u2).
(datatype event {
case New(term,usage)
case Bad(term)
case Request(term,term,term)
case Response(term,term,term,term) })
(typedef \bool log[event])
(def \bool leq log(log L1,log L2)
{ return ∀event e;
L1[e] ⇒L2[e]; })
(def \bool valid log(log L)
{ return
(∀ term t; usage u; L[New(t,u)] ⇒
∃bytes b; t == Literal(b)) &&
(∀ term t; usage u1,u2;
L[New(t,u1)] ⇒
L[New(t,u2)] ⇒
u1 == u2); })
A central idea of cryptographic invariants is that each key usage has an
associated payload property, which relates keys and payloads to which honest
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principals can apply the corresponding cryptographic primitive. The payload
property RPCKeyABPayload a b m L says that a key shared between a and b
may be used to compute the keyed hash of a payload m when m is a pair
composed of a constant tag tagRequest, and a request from a to b on which
the Request event has been logged in L, or when it is a pair composed of a
constant tag tagResponse, together with the injective pairing of a request req
and a response resp on which the Response event has been logged in L. The
formatting conditions are abstracted in the Requested and Responded predicates.
We combine payload properties in the definition of general preconditions, such
as the canHmac predicate below, which serves as a precondition, in code, to the
keyed hashing function when called by honest participants.
Coq and VCC definitions for payload conditions
Definition KeyAB a b k (L: log) :=
Logged (New k (HmacKey (U KeyAB a b))) L.
Definition KeyABPayload a b m (L: log) :=
(∃ req,
Requested m req ∧
Logged (Request a b req) L) ∨
(∃ req, ∃resp,
Responded m req resp ∧
Logged (Response a b req resp) L).
Definition canHmac (k m: term) (L: log) :=
(∃ a, ∃b,
KeyAB a b k L ∧
KeyABPayload a b p L).
(def \bool KeyAB(term a,term b,term k,log
L)
{ return
L[New(k,HmacKey(U KeyAB(a,b)))]; })
(def \bool KeyABPayload(term a,term b,
term m,log L)
{ return
(∃ term req; Requested(m,req) &&
L[Request(a,b,req)]) ||
(∃ term req,resp;
Responded(m,req,resp) &&
L[Response(a,b,req,resp)]); })
(def \bool canHmac(term k,term m,log L)
{ return
∃term a,b;
KeyAB(a,b,k,L) &&
KeyABPayload(a,b,m,L); })
Another central idea is that each nonce or key has a compromise condition,
which needs to be fulfilled before a literal given that usage can be released to the
attacker. Implicitly, bytestrings with usage AttackerGuess are always known to
the attacker. Our next predicate defines the compromise condition for HMAC
keys. In the general case where there are several usages, the hmacComp predicate
gathers them all in a disjunction that serves as an abstract way of expressing
key compromise.
Coq and VCC definitions for compromise conditions
Definition KeyABComp a b k (L: log) :=
Logged (Bad a) L ∨
Logged (Bad b) L.
Definition hmacComp (k: term) (L: log) :=
(∃ a, ∃b,
KeyAB a b k L ∧
KeyABComp a b k L).
(def \bool KeyABComp(term a,term b,log L)
{ return L[Bad(a)] || L[Bad(b)]; })
(def \bool hmacComp(term k,log L)
{ return
∃term a,b;
KeyAB(a,b,k,L) &&
KeyABComp(a,b,L); })
3.3 Inductive Level Predicate
Given these auxiliary predicates, we now define the Level predicate. We intend
that given a log L, any term t sent or received on the network satisfies Level Low
t L, while if t is data manipulated internally by principals, we must have Level
High t L. (The Level predicate consolidates both the Pub and Bytes predicates
from [33]; specifically, Level Low is a predicate equivalent to Pub, and Level High
is a predicate equivalent to Bytes.) It easily follows from the definition that any
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term satisfying Level Low also satisfies Level High (but not the converse, because
for example uncompromised keys and nonces satisfy Level High but not Level
Low until they are compromised). We also prove that Level l is a monotonic
function of its log argument for all l, which will help greatly when using the
definitions in VCC. Additionally, we also prove slight variants of some of the
rules that will be used to help VCC and Z3 efficiently instantiate quantified
variables.
Coq inductive definitions for the Level predicate
Inductive level := Low | High.
Inductive Level: level →term →log →Prop :=
| Level AttackerGuess: ∀l bs L, (∗ AttackerGuesses are always Low ∗)
Logged (New (Literal bs) AttackerGuess) L →
Level l (Literal bs) L
| Level Nonce: ∀l bs L nu, (∗ Nonces are Low when compromised ∗)
Logged (New (Literal bs) (Nonce nu)) L →
(l = Low →nonceComp (Literal bs) L) →
Level l (Literal bs) L
| Level HMacKey: ∀l bs L hu, (∗ HMacKeys are Low when compromised ∗)
Logged (New (Literal bs) (HMacKey hu)) L →
(l = Low →hmacComp (Literal bs) L) →
Level l (Literal bs) L
| Level SEncKey: ∀l bs L su, (∗ SEncKeys are Low when compromised ∗)
Logged (New (Literal bs) (SEncKey su)) L →
(l = Low →sencComp (Literal bs) L) →
Level l (Literal bs) L
| Level Pair: ∀l t1 t2 L, (∗ Pairs have same level as their components ∗)
Level l t1 L →
Level l t2 L →
Level l (Pair t1 t2) L
| Level Hmac: ∀l k m L, (∗ HMAC with payload matching payload property ∗)
canHmac k m L →
Level l m L →
Level l (Hmac k m) L
| Level Hmac Low: ∀l k m L, (∗ HMAC with compromised or Low key ∗)
Level Low k L →
Level Low m L →
Level l (Hmac k m) L
| Level SEnc: ∀l l’ k p L, (∗ SEnc with plaintext matching payload property ∗)
canSEnc k p L →
Level l’ p L →
Level l (SEnc k p) L
| Level SEnc Low: ∀l k p L, (∗ SEnc with compromised or Low key ∗)
Level Low k L →
Level Low p L →
Level l (SEnc k p) L
Theorem Low High: ∀t L, Level Low t L →Level High t L.
Theorem Level Positive: ∀l t L L’, log leq L L’ →Level l t L →Level l t L’.
Unlike all previously presented definitions, this predicate and all the the-
orems to come are not imported as structural definitions into VCC. Instead,
the Level predicate is declared as an uninterpreted function; and each rule and
theorem is separately imported as a first-order axiom. They are imported using
the rule or theorem macros, that both expand to the axiom keyword, erasing the
name.
The following snippet of VCC code shows the VCC axiomatisation corre-
sponding to the subset of the rules above used in the RPC protocol. The terms
in curly braces are triggers, that guide the SMT-solver when instantiating the
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quantified variables, and can significantly improve performance (and sometimes
induce termination), at the cost of some loss in precision. The triggers shown
here should be good enough for most protocols, but the reader willing to exper-
iment should read [47].
Axiomatic VCC definition for Level (excerpt) and related theorems
(datatype level {
case Low()
case High() })
(abstract \bool Level(level l,term t,log L))
(rule(Level AttackerGuess)
∀level l; bytes bs; log L;
L[New(Literal(bs),AttackerGuess())] ⇒
Level(l,Literal(bs),L))
(rule(Level HmacKey)
∀level l; bytes bs; log L; hmacKeyUsage hu;
{ HmacKey(hu), Level(l,Literal(bs),L) }
L[New(Literal(bs),HmacKey(hu))] ⇒
(l == Low() ⇒hmacComp(Literal(bs),L)) ⇒
Level(l,Literal(bs),L))
(rule(Level Pair)
∀level l; term t1,t2; log L;
{ Level(l,Pair(t1,t2),L) }
Level(l,t1,L) ⇒
Level(l,t2,L) ⇒
Level(l,Pair(t1,t2),L))
(rule(Level Hmac)
∀level l; term k,m; log L;
canHmac(k,m,L) ⇒
Level(l,m,L) ⇒
Level(l,Hmac(k,m),L))
(rule(Level Hmac Low)
∀level l; term k,m; log L;
Level(Low(),k,L) ⇒
Level(Low(),m,L) ⇒
Level(l,Hmac(k,m),L))
(theorem(Low High)
∀term t; log L;
Level(Low(),t,L) ⇒
Level(High(),t,L))
(theorem(Level Positive)
∀log L1,L2; level l; term t;
leq log(L1,L2) ⇒
Level(l,t,L1) ⇒
Level(l,t,L2))
(theorem(Pair Level)
∀level l; term t1,t2; log L;
Level(l,Pair(t1,t2),L) ⇒
Level(l,t1,L) && Level(l,t2,L))
We state secrecy properties of the protocol as consequences of the invariants
respected by the code. We prove in the following theorem that HMAC keys are
kept secret unless their compromise condition is fulfilled. We actually state the
contrapositive: that if Level Low holds on the key (intuitively, if the key is not
secret), then one of the principals that shares it is Bad. The proof is an almost
direct application of the inversion principle for the Level HmacKey inductive rule
above: the only way for a literal with an HMAC key usage to be Low is for its
compromise condition to hold.
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Secrecy theorems for HMAC keys in Coq and VCC
Theorem WeakSecrecyKeyAB: ∀a b k L,
Good L →
KeyAB a b k L →
Level Low k L →
Logged (Bad a) L ∨Logged (Bad b) L.
(theorem(WeakSecrecyKeyAB)
∀term k,a,b; log L;
valid log(L) ⇒
KeyAB(a,b,k,L) ⇒
Level(Low(),k,L) ⇒
L[Bad(a)] || L[Bad(b)])
This secrecy property states the absence of a direct flow of a key to the
opponent, unless one of the associated principals is compromised. We do not
address here how to show noninterference properties, i.e. the absence of indirect
flows.
Finally, we state a simple inversion theorem for HMACs (and similarly for
all cryptographic primitives if necessary), stating that, in a good log, an HMAC
computed using a valid key (which can be compromised, but has to have a
correct usage) can only be High if either canHmac holds on the key and payload,
or the key is compromised.
Coq and VCC inversion theorem for HMACs
Theorem Hmac Inversion: ∀hu m k L,
Good L →
Logged (New k (HmacKey hu)) L →
Level High (Hmac k m) L →
canHmac k m L ∨hmacComp k L.
(theorem(Hmac Inversion)
∀hmacKeyUsage hu; term m,k; log L;
valid log(L) ⇒
L[New(k,HmacKey(hu))] ⇒
Level(High(),Hmac(k,m),L) ⇒
canHmac(k,m,L) || hmacComp(k,L))
We embed the assertions from the narration at the start of this section
within the code at the points that the request and response messages have been
validated; to verify these assertions we simply rely on the postcondition of MAC
verification, and the definition of canHmac and hmacComp.
3.4 Correspondence Theorems
However, it may be desirable to prove directly on the abstract model that the
defined usages, along with their payload and compromise conditions do indeed
guarantee desired authentication properties, regardless of the implementation,
both in terms of protocol narration and of concrete implementation (for example,
to prove security properties of the model before implementing the protocol).
To do so, we prove the following two correspondence theorems in Coq. The
first states that if there is a public HMAC keyed by a key with usage KeyAB, and
starting with tag tagRequest, then either Request has been logged on the rest of
the payload, or one of the principals involved in the exchange is compromised.
The second states a similar result for responses.
Coq theorems for correspondence properties
Theorem AuthenticationRequest: ∀a b req k L,
Good L →
KeyAB a b k L →
Level Low (Hmac k (Pair tagRequest req)) L →
Logged (Request a b req) L ∨
Logged (Bad a) L ∨
Logged (Bad b) L.
Theorem AuthenticationResponse: ∀a b req resp k L,
Good L →
KeyAB a b k L →
Level Low (Hmac k (Pair tagResponse (Pair req
resp))) L →
Logged (Response a b req resp) L) ∨
Logged (Bad a) L ∨
Logged (Bad b) L.
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4 Representation Table and Hybrid Wrappers
4.1 The Representation Table
Symbolic models of cryptography generally assume that two distinct symbolic
terms yield two distinct byte strings, and that fresh literals cannot be guessed
by an attacker. The intent is to use such a model with cryptographic operations
that, in the computational model, have a negligible probability of collision.
Verification in the symbolic model is a way of ruling out a well-defined class of
attacks, which do not depend on collisions or lucky guesses.
Prior work on cryptographic software in F#, for example [16, 13], relies on
type abstraction to verify protocol code, by reasoning in terms of purely sym-
bolic libraries, which satisfy these assumptions, instead of concrete libraries,
which do not. In the absence of type abstraction in C, we must verify protocol
code linked with concrete cryptographic algorithms on byte strings. Our aim
remains to verify against an attacker in the symbolic model. To do so, we in-
strument the program with specification code that maintains a representation
table, which tracks the correspondence between concrete byte strings and sym-
bolic terms. We intercept all calls to cryptographic functions with ghost code
to update the representation table. We say a collision occurs when the table
associates a single byte string with two distinct symbolic terms.
For example, suppose x and
y are two distinct bytestrings
that have the same HMAC, h,
under a key k. After the first
call to hmac() the table looks
like this:
Bytestring Term
k Literal k
x Literal x
y Literal y
h Hmac k x
When computing the second HMAC, our instrumented hmac() function tries
to insert the freshly computed h and the corresponding term Hmac k y in the
table, but detects that h is already associated with a distinct term Hmac k x.
We make the absence of such collisions an explicit hypothesis in our spec-
ification by assuming, via an assume statement in the ghost code updating the
table, that a collision has not occurred. This removes from consideration any
computation following a collision, as is made precise in Section 5. We treat the
event of the attacker guessing a non-public value in a similar way; we assume
it does not happen, using an assume statement. In this way, we prove symbolic
security properties of the C code. A separate argument may be made that such
collisions only happen with low probability.
Like the log, we define the table as a ghost object, this time a functional
record.
Representation tables in VCC
(record table {
\bool DefinedB[bytes];
term B2T[bytes];
\bool DefinedT[term];
bytes T2B[term]; })
(def \bool valid table(log L,table T)
{ return
(∀ bytes b;
T.DefinedT[Literal(b)] ⇒
T.T2B[Literal(b)] == b) &&
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(∀ term t;
T.DefinedT[t] ⇒
Level(High(),t,L)) &&
(∀ bytes b;
T.DefinedB[b] ⇒
T.T2B[T.B2T[b]] == b) &&
(∀ term t;
T.DefinedT[t] ⇒
T.B2T[T.T2B[t]] == t) &&
(∀ bytes b;
T.DefinedB[b] ⇒
T.DefinedT[T.B2T[b]]) &&
(∀ term t;
T.DefinedT[t] ⇒
T.DefinedB[T.T2B[t]]); })
(def \bool leq table(table T1,table T2)
{ return
(∀ bytes b;
T1.DefinedB[b] ⇒
T2.DefinedB[b]) &&
(∀ bytes b;
T1.DefinedB[b] ⇒
T1.B2T[b] == T2.B2T[b]) &&
(∀ term t;
T1.DefinedT[t] ⇒
T2.DefinedT[t]) &&
(∀ term t;
T1.DefinedT[t] ⇒
T1.T2B[t] == T2.T2B[t]); })
We use two maps to store the bijection between bytes, which are bytestring
values (not pointers), and terms. The predicate valid table expresses that the B2T
and T2B maps of a table do indeed represent a bijection, and also adds conditions
relating elements stored in the table to a particular log. We also define an order
on tables, which is the standard order on pairs of partial functions.
Before interfacing these ghost objects with concrete C code, we provide a
global wrapper allowing us to manipulate the log and table without passing
them explicitly as arguments.
Global cryptographic state
(ghost (claimable) struct cryptoState s
{
volatile log L;
volatile table T;
(invariant valid log(L))
(invariant leq log(\old(L),L))
(invariant valid table(L,T))
(invariant leq table(\old(T),T))
} CS;)
The two fields are made volatile, and the structure will be initially closed
to ensure that all updates have to follow its two-state invariants, stating that
the log and table have to grow over all transitions. Additionally, the one-state
invariant states that the log is always valid, ensuring that all the theorems we
proved in Coq apply, and that the table is always valid with respect to the log,
ensuring that the symbolic security assumptions are never violated.
4.2 The Hybrid Wrappers
We want to ensure that all cryptographic operations are used in ways that pre-
serve the cryptographic state’s invariants. We provide hybrid wrappers around
the concrete library functions; wrappers are not only verified to maintain the
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table’s invariants but also serve to give symbolic contracts to a cryptographic
interface working with concrete bytes.
For simplicity in this paper, the hybrid wrappers manipulate a structure
type bytes c containing all information pertaining to a byte array.
A type for byte strings
typedef struct {
unsigned char ∗ptr;
unsigned long len;
(ghost bytes encoding)
(invariant \mine((unsigned char[len]) ptr))
(invariant encoding == from array(ptr,len))
} bytes c;
In particular, we keep not only a pointer to the concrete byte array consid-
ered and its length, but we also add a ghost field of type bytes, representing—as
a mathematical integer—the byte string value contained by the len bytes at
memory location ptr. For the invariants of bytes c to be admissible, we also make
sure, using the \mine keyword, that the heap-allocated byte array of length len
pointed to by ptr is always owned by the structure, ensuring in particular that it
is never modified while the structure is kept closed. Idiomatic C manipulates the
beginning address and length separately. Porting our method to a lower-level
programming style is only a matter of providing the necessary memory-safety
annotations, which would in any event be needed to verify non-cryptographic
properties of the code, such as memory safety. This is discussed further, and
applied to some example code, in [3].
As an example, here is the contract of our hybrid wrapper for the hmac sha1()
cryptographic function.
Hybrid interface for hmacsha1()
int hmacsha1(bytes c ∗k, bytes c ∗b, bytes c ∗res
(ghost \claim c))
// Claim property
(always c, (&CS)−>\closed)
// Properties of input byte strings
(maintains \wrapped(k))
(maintains \wrapped(b))
// Properties of out parameter
(writes \extent(res), c)
(ensures !\result ⇒\wrapped(res))
// Cryptographic contract
(requires CS.T.DefinedB[k−>encoding])
(requires CS.T.DefinedB[b−>encoding])
(ensures !\result ⇒CS.T.DefinedB[res−>encoding])
// Cryptographic properties on input terms
(requires
canHmac(CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding],CS.L)
|| (Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.L) &&
Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding],CS.L)))
// Cryptographic properties on output term
(ensures !\result ⇒
CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding] ==
Hmac(CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding]));
To ensure that the log and table are kept stable during the call, as well
as to allow concurrent updates to the cryptographic states, we pass in, as a
ghost parameter, a claim c guaranteeing that the global container CS remains
closed whenever the claim is closed. All other desired properties (monotonic
growth and validity, in particular) are consequences of this simple fact and can
be derived by VCC. The next lines of the contract deal with memory-safety
concerns, in this case expressing the fact that the arguments are wrapped at
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call-site and return-site, and that the (typed) memory location pointed to by
the third argument is written to by the function, and is wrapped on successful
return from the function. The claim c is added to the list of objects that may be
written by the function in case it is necessary to strengthen the claimed property
to help the proof go through.
The first three lines under “Cryptographic contract” deal only with the
table, stating that the input byte strings should appear in the table, and that,
upon successful return from the function, the output byte string appears in
the table. Finally, we require as a precondition that either canHmac holds on
the input parameters in the current cryptographic state (catering for an honest
participant’s calling conditions), or both the key and payload are Low (catering
for calls by the attacker).
On successful return, we guarantee in the postcondition that the output byte
string is associated, in the table, with the term obtained by applying the Hmac
constructor to the terms associated with the input byte strings.
An honest client, when calling this function, will establish that canHmac holds
on the terms associated with the input byte arrays. We recall that the definition
of canHmac is in general a disjunction of clauses of the form “k has HMAC key
usage u, and m fulfills the payload condition for u in the log”. In the particular
case of our HMAC-based authenticated RPC protocol, an honest participant
will know that u is indeed U KeyAB(a,b) for some a and b, and will attempt to
prove that the payload is either a well-formatted request on which the Request
event has been logged for a and b, or a well-formatted response on which the
Response event has been logged for a and b.
A typical hybrid wrapper implementation first performs the concrete opera-
tion on byte strings (e.g., by calling a cryptographic library) before performing
updates on the ghost state to ensure the cryptographic postconditions, whilst
maintaining the log and table invariants. To do so, it first computes the ex-
pected cryptographic term by looking up, in the table, the terms associated
with the input byte strings and applying the suitable constructor. Once both
the concrete byte string and the corresponding terms are computed, the im-
plementation can check for collisions, and in case there are none, update the
table (and the log) as expected. In case a collision happens, an assume statement
expresses that our symbolic cryptography assumptions have been violated.
A hybrid wrapper for hmacsha1()
int hmacsha1(bytes c ∗k, bytes c ∗b, bytes c ∗res
(ghost \claim c))
{ (ghost term tb,tk,th)
(ghost \bool collision = \false)
(assert Level(High(),Hmac(CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding],CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding]),CS.L))
(ghost \claim c0 = \make claim({ c }, (&CS)−>\closed && GrowsCS))
res−>len = 20;
res−>ptr = (unsigned char∗) malloc(res−>len);
if (res−>ptr == NULL)
return 1;
sha1 hmac(k−>ptr, (unchecked)((int) k−>len), b−>ptr, (unchecked)((int) b−>len), res
−>ptr);
(ghost res−>encoding = from array(res−>ptr,res−>len))
(ghost \wrap((unsigned char[res−>len]) res−>ptr))
(ghost \wrap(res))
(ghost (atomic c0, &CS) {
tb = CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding];
tk = CS.T.B2T[k−>encoding];
th = Hmac(tk,tb); // Compute the symbolic term
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if ((CS.T.DefinedB[res−>encoding] &&
CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding] != th) ||
(CS.T.DefinedT[th] &&
CS.T.T2B[th] != res−>encoding))
collision = \true;
else
{
CS.T.DefinedT[th] = \true;
CS.T.T2B[th] = res−>encoding;
CS.T.DefinedB[res−>encoding] = \true;
CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding] = th;
}
})
(assume !collision) // Our symbolic crypto assumption
return 0; }
Our implementation of an HMAC SHA1 wrapper, shown above, uses the
PolarSSL project’s sha1 hmac() function ([52]).
The unchecked keyword is used to let VCC ignore the potential arithmetic
overflow due to the type casts. We could in fact provide annotations that
guarantee that the cast never overflows, for example by providing an upper
bound on the lengths of keys and bytestrings.
We also use the GrowsCS macro, defined below, which is claimed on the cryp-
tographic state (log and table), guiding VCC through the proof by expanding
to the transitive closure of the order on cryptographic states: the cryptographic
state at the program point where the claim is created is smaller than the cryp-
tographic state at any program point afterwards.
Transitive closure of the order relation on cryptographic states
#define GrowsCS\
(leq log(\when claimed(CS.L),CS.L) &&\
leq table(\when claimed(CS.T),CS.T))
Since the cryptographic state is shared, and its fields marked volatile, all
reads and writes from and to the log and table need to occur in atomic blocks
guarded by a claim c ensuring, at least, that the global CS object is closed. In our
particular case, the claim needs to be slightly stronger, as we rely heavily on the
transitivity of the two-state invariant (an order relation), which VCC does not
automatically infer and use. To strengthen the claim c, we simply create a claim
c0 on c, whose property immediately follows from the log and table invariants,
and guarantees their monotonic growth despite interference from other threads.
We also provide a function toString (whose contract is shown below), con-
verting an ordinary string pointer to a bytes c, the input type for functions like
hmacsha1. It logs a New event with usage AttackerGuess and assumes the guessed
literal does not collide with any other term already in the table.
Contract for the toString wrapper
int toString(unsigned char ∗in, unsigned long inl, bytes c ∗res (ghost \claim c))
(maintains \thread local array(in,inl) && inl != 0)
(requires \disjoint(\array range(in,inl),\extent(res)))
(writes \extent(res))
(ensures \result ⇒\mutable(res))
(ensures !\result ⇒\wrapped with deep domain(res))
(always c, (&CS)−>\closed)
(ensures !\result ⇒CS.T.DefinedB[res−>encoding])
(ensures !\result ⇒Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding],CS.L))
(ensures !\result ⇒res−>encoding == \old(from array(in,inl)))
(ensures !\result ⇒CS.T.B2T[res−>encoding] == Literal(res−>encoding));
We also provide a function bytescmp, that compares two bytes c objects, and
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pair and destruct functions that marshal and unmarshal bytes c objects into and
from injective pairs.
4.3 Verifying Protocol Code
The groundwork needed to specify and verify the RPC protocol code is now
complete. The following shows a slightly simplified version of the annotated
code for the client role, where the Request event is logged by the atomic
assignment and the final correspondence is asserted as a disjunction of events
taking into account the potential compromise of one of the principals involved.
Each of the function calls is verified to happen in a state where the function’s
precondition holds. In particular, the call to the channel write() function yields a
proof obligation that the term corresponding to the second argument is Low in
the current cryptographic state. The return statements are for various kinds of
failure, effectively aborting the client in such cases. As in the hybrid wrappers,
we use a local claim c0 (with the same claimed property) to encode the fact
that the log and table grow with time. The reference cryptographic state for
the transitivity argument is updated, by simply re-claiming the same property
in a new state, between all calls to hybrid wrappers.
Annotated RPC client code
void client(bytes c ∗alice, bytes c ∗bob, bytes c ∗kab, bytes c ∗req, channel∗ chan (ghost \claim
c))
(maintains \wrapped(alice) && \wrapped(bob) &&
\wrapped(kab) && \wrapped(req))
(always c, (&CS)−>\closed)
(writes c)
(requires CS.T.DefinedB[alice−>encoding] &&
CS.T.DefinedB[bob−>encoding] &&
CS.T.DefinedB[kab−>encoding] &&
CS.T.DefinedB[req−>encoding])
(requires Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[alice−>encoding],CS.L) &&
Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[bob−>encoding],CS.L) &&
Level(Low(),CS.T.B2T[req−>encoding],CS.L) &&
Level(High(),table.B2T[kab−>encoding]),CS.L)
(requires
RPCKeyAB(CS.T.B2T[alice−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[bob−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[kab−>encoding],
CS.L));
{
(ghost \claim c0 = createRunningClaim(c))
bytes c ∗toMAC1, ∗mac1, ∗msg1;
bytes c ∗msg2, ∗resp, ∗toMAC2, ∗mac2;
// Event
(ghost { (atomic c, &CS)
CS.L[Request(CS.T.B2T[a−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[req−>encoding])] = \true; })
// Build and send request message
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((toMAC1 = malloc(sizeof(∗toMAC1))) == NULL) return;
if (request(req, toMAC1 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((mac1 = malloc(sizeof(∗mac1))) == NULL) return;
if (hmacsha1(kab, toMAC1, mac1 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((msg1 = malloc(sizeof(∗msg1))) == NULL) return;
if (pair(req, mac1, msg1 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if (channel write(chan, msg1 (ghost c))) return;
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// Receive and check response message
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((msg2 = malloc(sizeof(∗msg2))) == NULL) return;
if (channel read(chan, msg2 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((resp = malloc(sizeof(∗resp))) == NULL) return;
if ((mac2 = malloc(sizeof(∗mac2))) == NULL) return;
if (destruct(msg2, resp, mac2 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if ((toMAC2 = malloc(sizeof(∗toMAC2))) == NULL) return;
if (response(req, resp, toMAC2 (ghost c))) return;
(ghost refreshCryptoState(c0))
if (!hmacsha1Verify(kab, toMAC2, mac2 (ghost c))) return;
// Correspondence assertion
(assert \active claim(c0))
(assert CS.L[Response(CS.T.B2T[alice−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[bob−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[req−>encoding],
CS.T.B2T[resp−>encoding])]
|| CS.L[Bad(CS.T.B2T[a−>encoding])]
|| CS.L[Bad(CS.T.B2T[b−>encoding])]);
}
To prove that the correspondence assertion holds, VCC will use the post-
conditions of hmacsha1Verify(), stating that a zero return value implies that either
canHmac holds on the key and payload, or the key used for verifying the MAC is
Low. This fact, combined with the fact that toMAC2 is known to have a correct
reponse format, as it is the result of a successful call to the response() function,
and the fact that the response message is Low, since it is read from the network
allows VCC to prove the correspondence assertion by unfolding the definition
of canHmac.
5 Assumptions Concerning the C Verifier
Several research papers [24, 25] document the VCC system but there is no for-
mal model of its semantics of programs and specifications aside from the VCG
itself. To be able to formulate a precise specification of the program properties
(in particular security properties) verified by VCC, we sketch a conventional
operational semantics, in terms of which we specify what we assume about the
verifier. The model sketched here has been formalized as part of our Coq de-
velopment. The model idealizes from low-level features of C, using instead a
simple Java-like heap model which suffices to formalize the key ideas (just as it
does in the paper formalizing the VCC invariant methodology [25]). The model
serves to define two semantic notions —assertion failure and safe command—
in terms of which we state our assumption that successful verification by VCC
implies safety. Translating these semantic definitions to an operational seman-
tics of low level C code is routine. What would be a major undertaking is to
formally prove soundness of the VCG. (Such formalization is reported to be in
progress [55, 26].) Our assumption is justified, however, by extensive expert
review of the VCG and extensive use of VCC.
Leaving aside annotations, a program consists of type and function declara-
tions. The body of a function is a sequence of commands including concurrency
primitives: thread fork, send, and receive on named channels (all channels being
visible to the attacker). Local variables and function parameters (and returns)
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have declared types and in our model there are no type casts.
An execution environment consists of a self-contained collection of type and
function declarations. For a given execution environment, a runtime configura-
tion takes the form (h, ts, qs) where h is the heap, ts is the thread pool, and
qs is a map from channel names to message queues. A thread state consists
of a command (its current continuation) and a local store (that is, a mapping
of locals and parameters to their current values); a thread pool is a finite list
of thread states. Thus threads share the heap and the message queues (which
hold messages sent but not yet received). A run is a series of configurations
that are successors in the transition relation. The transition relation allows
nondeterministic selection of any thread that is not blocked waiting to receive
on an empty channel. A single step (transition) may be an assignment, the test
of a branch condition, creation of a new thread, and so forth. Nondeterministic
scheduling models all interleavings including ones that may be preferred by an
attacker.
A state predicate is a predicate on a heap together with a store. The store is
used for function parameters and results, which are thread local. The precondi-
tion of a function contract is a state predicate; its postcondition is a two-state
predicate that refers to the initial and final state of the function’s invocation. An
invariant is a predicate on a pointer together with a pair of heaps, as described
earlier.
The only unusual feature of the operational semantics is our treatment of
assumptions, which are usually only given an axiomatic semantics. If there is
any thread poised to execute the command assume p, and the condition p does
not hold in the current configuration, then there is no transition—we say there
is an assumption failure. If all current assumptions hold, then some thread takes
a step. Thus some runs end with a “stuck” configuration from which there are
no successors. The only other stuck configurations are those where every thread
is blocked waiting on an empty channel. A divergent atomic block would also be
stuck in our semantics, but we only use manifestly terminating atomic blocks.
We also disallow assume statements in atomic blocks.
Execution of assume p takes a single step with no effect on state. Execution
of assert p also has no effect on the state—nor does it have an enabling condi-
tion. An assertion is effectively a labelled skip, in terms of which we formulate
correctness.
Definition 1 (Safe Command). An assertion failure is a run in which there is
a configuration where some thread’s active command is assert p for some p that
does not hold in that configuration, or some object’s invariant fails to hold, and
there is no assumption failure at that point. A configuration is safe if none of
its runs are assertion failures. A command c is safe under precondition p if for
states satisfying p, the configuration with that initial state and the single thread
c is a safe configuration.
Given our treatment of assumptions, safety means that there is no assertion
failure unless and until there is an assumption failure.
VCC works in a procedure-modular way: it verifies that each function imple-
mentation satisfies its contract, under the assumption of specified contracts for
all functions directly called in the body. We formalize this in terms of program
fragments, for which we use names ending in .c or .h for code or interface texts,
as mnemonic for usual file names; but these may be catenations of multiple files.
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Definition 2 (Verifiable). We write api.h ` p.c q.h to mean there exists p′.c
that instruments p.c with additional ghost code (but no additional assumptions,
and no other changes), and q′.h that may extend q.h with contracts for addi-
tional functions (but not alter those in q.h) and type invariants, such that VCC
successfully verifies the implementation of each function f in p′.c against the
contract for f in q′.h, under hypotheses api.h and q′.h; moreover admissibility
holds for all the type invariants.
The most common additions to p.c are assertions that serve as hints to
guide the prover, but claims and other ghost code can be added. Assumptions
would subvert the intended specifications and could even be unsound. The
most common additions to q.h are contracts, as q.h may only provide contracts
for functions of interest such as main, whereas the code p.c may include other
functions, which for modular reasoning must have contracts.
There are two interpretations of the phrase “verified by VCC” in Definition 2.
The mathematical interpretation is that the VCs are valid; this idealizes from
limitations of the VCG implementation as well as limitations of the theorem
prover used to check validity. The pragmatic interpretation is that the actual
tool runs successfully (which, modulo bugs, is stronger than the mathematical
interpretation). The results in this section hold for either interpretation. And of
course we have run the actual tool as described in the next sections. However,
in Section 7 the key Lemma 2 only holds for the mathematical interpretation.
Note that, given headers p.h and api.h and a program p.c, VCC never suc-
cessfully verifies p.c against p.h with api.h unless p.c compiles against p.h with
api.h, which in particular means that p.h+ api.h are a closed collection of dec-
larations. An immediate consequence of Definition 2 is the following, where the
+ operator stands for catenation.
Lemma 1 (VCC Modularity). If p.h ` q.c  q.h and p.h + q.h ` r.c  r.h
then p.h ` q.c + r.c q.h + r.h.
The VCC methodology supports verification conditions for sound modular
reasoning, but it is not easy to give a VCG-independent semantics for the verifi-
ability judgement p.h ` q.c q.h. Fortunately, for our purposes we do not need
a semantic notion of modular correctness. It is enough to consider soundness
for complete programs. A complete program is verified as ∅ ` m.c main.h.
main.h
void main()
(requires \program entry point())
(writes \universe());
The \program entry point() precondition means that all global objects exist and
are owned by the current thread at the beginning of this function, as it is the
first function that is called when the process is started. Additionally, the main
function is allowed to write in the process’s entire memory space.
Assumption 1 (VCC Soundness). If ∅ ` m.c main.h then the body of function
main in m.c is safe for the precondition in main.h.
VCC checks that ghost state is used in ways that are sound for reasoning
about actual observations; that is, it has no influence on non-ghost state except
for introducing additional steps that do not change non-ghost state.
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Assumption 2 (VCC Ghost). Let m.c be any complete program, which may
include ghost state and ghost code, and let m̂.c be the program with ghost code
(including declarations) removed. For any run R of m.c, let Rˆ be the sequence
of configurations obtained from R by removing ghost code, ghost variables, ghost
fields, objects reachable only from ghost variables on the current stack, and con-
figurations reached by steps of ghost code. We assume (a) Ghost code does not
introduce new observable behaviours: For any run R of m.c, Rˆ is a run of m̂.c.
(b) Ghost code does not remove observable behaviours except at assumption fail-
ures: For any run R of m̂.c, there is a run S of m.c such that R is a prefix of
Sˆ and either R = Sˆ or R ends at an assumption failure.
6 Attack Programs
An attacker in the symbolic model can intercept messages on unprotected com-
munication links (such as the Internet) and send messages constructed from
parts of intercepted messages, as specified by a term algebra. We model the
set of all possible attacks, each attack being represented by an attack program,
which is C code of a particular form. In this section, we sketch the formal
definition of attack programs, relative to a suitable interface, and give an ex-
ample. Attack programs are what enable us, in Section 7, to use an ordinary
program verifier to reason about active attackers. We considered formalizing
standard models of network attackers in terms of our symbolic model, in order
to prove that our attack programs do capture the standard notion, but this is
straightforward and not illuminating.
An attack program is a straight-line C program that compiles against an
attacker interface. Such an interface provides some “opaque” type declarations
together with some function signatures; these include message send/receive,
standard cryptographic operations, and protocol-specific actions like creating
sessions and initiating roles. For an annotated interface p.h, we let erase(p.h)
be the attacker interface obtained by deleting annotations and the bodies of
type declarations.
Attacker interfaces
T ::= type
bool | unsigned char∗ | X∗
µ ::= entry in an interface
typedef X; type declaration
T f(T1 x1, . . . , Tn xn) function prototype (n ≥ 0)
void f(T1 x1, . . . , Tn xn) procedure prototype (n ≥ 0)
I ::= µ1 . . . µn interface (n ≥ 0)
Recall the software stack shown in Section 1.3; the file RPCshim.h provides a
network attacker interface including generic cryptography and network opera-
tions as well as protocol specific functions.
An attacker interface: erase(RPCshim.h)
typedef bytespub;
bytespub∗ att toBytespub(unsigned char∗ ptr, unsigned long len);
bytespub∗ att pair(bytespub∗ b1, bytespub∗ b2);
bytespub∗ att fst(bytespub∗ b);
bytespub∗ att snd(bytespub∗ b);
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bytespub∗ att hmacsha1(bytespub∗ k, bytespub∗ b);
bool att hmacsha1Verify(bytespub∗ k, bytespub∗ b, bytespub∗ m);
void att channel write(channel∗ chan, bytespub∗ b);
bytespub∗ att channel read(channel∗ chan);
typedef session;
session∗ att setup(bytespub∗ cl, bytespub∗ se);
void att run client(session∗ s, bytespub∗ request);
void att run server(session∗ s);
bytespub∗ att compromise client(session∗s);
bytespub∗ att compromise server(session∗s);
channel∗ att getChannel client(session∗ s);
channel∗ att getChannel server(session∗ s);
Type bytespub is critical: its invariant constrains its values to be concrete
byte arrays that correspond to Low terms. Verifying the implementation of
this attacker interface therefore provides a proof that the set of Low terms is
closed under attacker actions. The function contracts in RPCshim.h and code in
RPCshim.c are similar to the hybrid wrappers in Section 4.2 but oriented to Low
data. They are more complicated, due to memory safety annotations dealing
with thread fork and messaging, though that is mostly protocol-independent.
An example contract appears in Section 7.
Attack program for given interface I
An attack program for a given interface I has the form:
void main() { D C }
where D is a sequence of local variable declarations and C a sequence of commands,
such that:
1) Each of the declarations in D has the form T x;,
where T is either bool, unsigned char∗, or T∗ where T is declared in I.
2) Each command in the sequence C is either
(a) a function call assignment with variables as arguments, x = f(y...);
(b) a procedure call with variables as arguments f(y...); or
(c) an assignment x = s; where s is a string literal.
3) A variable is assigned at most once and every variable mentioned is declared in D.
4) For each function or procedure call, each argument variable is assigned
earlier in the sequence of commands.
5) In each call to a function or procedure f, there is a declaration of f in I
and each argument variable in the call has declared type identical to that of
the corresponding parameter of f.
6) In a function call assignment x = f(y...);, the declared type of x is the result
type of f. In a string assignment x = s; the declared type of x is unsigned char∗.
Owing to item 2, an attack program does not directly assign any object
field, nor any global variable. Nor does it directly invoke any operations except
functions and procedures in I (item 5). We show an example attack program
below, that models an attacker that runs an instance of the RPC protocol to
completion, passing the messages around correctly.
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An attack program for RPCshim.h (from RPCattack 0.c)
void main()
{ unsigned char ∗a,∗b,∗r;
bytespub ∗alice,∗bob,∗arg,∗req,∗resp;
channel ∗clientC,∗serverC;
session ∗s;
a = ”Alice”; alice = att toBytespub(a,5);
b = ”Bob”; bob = att toBytespub(b,3);
r = ”Request”; arg = att toBytespub(r,7);
s = att setup(alice,bob);
clientC = att getChannel client(s);
serverC = att getChannel server(s);
att run server(s);
att run client(s,arg);
req = att channel read(clientC);
att channel write(serverC,req);
resp = att channel read(serverC);
att channel write(clientC,resp);}
As an extra example, consider the attack program below, which models an
attack that would be successful against a flawed RPC protocol where the request
is not included in the response’s MAC:
A symbolic attack
A → B: payload | hmac(“request” | payload)
B → A: payload’ | hmac(“response” | payload’)
The program would break the correspondence property by making the client
accept a response that does not correspond to its request.
An attack program for RPCshim.h (from RPCattack 1.c)
void main()
{
unsigned char ∗a, ∗b, ∗r1, ∗r2;
bytespub ∗alice, ∗bob, ∗arg1, ∗req1, ∗resp1, ∗arg2, ∗req2;
session ∗s;
channel ∗clientC, ∗serverC;
// Setup phase
a = ”Alice”; alice = att toBytespub(a);
b = ”Bob”; bob = att toBytespub(b);
r1 = ”Request1”; arg1 = att toBytespub(r1);
r2 = ”Request2”; arg2 = att toBytespub(r2);
s = att setup(alice, bob);
clientC = att getChannel client(s);
serverC = att getChannel server(s);
// First run through of the protocol, the attacker observes
att run server(s);
att run client(s, arg1);
req1 = att channel read(clientC);
att channel write(serverC, req1);
resp1 = att channel read(serverC);
att channel write(clientC, resp1);
// Run only the client, with a different request, and respond with the first run’s response
att run client(s, arg2);
req2 = att channel read(clientC);
att channel write(serverC, resp1);
}
7 An Example Security Theorem
An attack program for the RPC protocol is a program that relies only on
RPCshim.h. To form an executable, it needs to be combined with System which we
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define to be the catenation crypto.c + RPChybrids.c + RPCprot.c. Here crypto.c is the
library of cryptographic algorithms (and we let it subsume OS libraries, e.g., for
memory allocation and sockets), which is used in RPChybrids.c and RPCprot.c.
Before providing the formal results, we informally describe a key property
on which soundness of our approach rests. Consider any attack program M.c
and any run of the program System + RPCshim.c + M.c. It is an invariant that at
every step of the run, the representation table holds every term that has arisen
by cryptographic computation or by invocation of the toBytesPub function, which
an attack must use to convert guessed bytestrings to type bytespub as needed to
invoke the other functions of RPCshim. This is not an invariant that we state
in the program annotations; its only role is to justify our use of assumptions.
The only assumptions used are in RPCshim.c and RPChybrids.c where collisions are
detected. In light of the key invariant, this means that in any run that reaches
an assumption failure, the sequence of terms computed includes a hash collision
or an attacker guess of a term that is not public according to the symbolic model
of cryptography. In short, assumptions are used only to encode the Dolev-Yao
model.
The contracts in RPCshim.h all follow a similar pattern; we give one for refer-
ence in the following proof.
Example contract from RPCshim.h
bytespub∗ att hmacsha1(bytespub∗ k, bytespub∗ b (ghost \claim c))
(maintains \wrapped(k))
(maintains \wrapped(b))
(writes k,b,c)
(always c, (&CS)−>\closed)
(ensures \wrapped(\result));
Attack programs were defined in order to show that their behaviours are
among those of interfering threads encompassed by the verification conditions
VCC imposes on protocol code. By soundness Assumption 1, this will be a
consequence of the following verifiability result.
Lemma 2. If M.c is an attack program for erase(RPCshim.h), then RPCshim.h `
M.c main.h.
As mentioned following Definition 2, we cannot prove this result under the
“pragmatic interpretation” that RPCshim.h ` M.c  main.h means M.c is ver-
ifiable by the VCC tool. There are infinitely many attack programs, most of
which are too large to even fit in storage much less be processed by the tool.
Instead, we consider the “mathematical interpretation”; that is, we show that
the VCs are valid. Some parts of the proof can still be done using the tool.
Proof. (Sketch) According to Definition 2 we have to show admissibility of the
type invariants in RPCshim.h; this we have checked using VCC. It remains to
prove verifiability of an arbitrary attack program against main.h.
Since the contract in main.h does not impose a postcondition and its write
specification is vacuous, we just need to show that invariants are established
and maintained. Let M.c be void main(){D C}. In accord with Definition 2 we will
show verifiability of code C′ which augments the statements of C with two sorts
of instrumentation. The first is simply to prefix C with ghost code that initializes
the representation table and log. This code is defined as a ghost function init(),
whose contract and body are shown in the code sample below, where maps
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are defined using VCC’s lambda notation, and the constants tagRequest() and
tagResponse() are separately defined to be the values of type bytes representing the
1-byte-long bytestrings ”1” and ”2”, respectively.
The init() function
(ghost void init(out \claim c)
(writes \extent(&CS))
(ensures \wrapped(&CS))
(ensures \wrapped(c) && \active claim(c))
(ensures \claims(c, (&CS)−>\closed))
{
// Initialize to empty log and table
CS.L = λevent e; \false;
CS.T.DefinedB = λbytes b; \false;
CS.T.DefinedT = λterm t; \false;
// Add protocol constants (tags) to log as attacker guesses
CS.L[New(Literal(tagRequest()),AttackerGuess())] = \true;
CS.L[New(Literal(tagResponse()),AttackerGuess())] = \true;
// Add protocol constants (tags) to table as Literalss
CS.T.DefinedB[tagRequest()] = \true;
CS.T.B2T[tagRequest()] = Literal(tagRequest());
CS.T.DefinedT[Literal(tagRequest())] = \true;
CS.T.T2B[Literal(tagRequest())] = tagRequest();
CS.T.DefinedB[tagResponse()] = \true;
CS.T.B2T[tagResponse()] = Literal(tagResponse());
CS.T.DefinedT[Literal(tagResponse())] = \true;
CS.T.T2B[Literal(tagResponse())] = tagResponse();
// Establish invariant and state claim
\wrap(&CS);
c = \make claim({ &CS }, \true);
})
We used VCC to verify the body of init(), which serves as proof that the
validity invariants are indeed satisfiable on the initial cryptographic state (com-
posed of the empty log, and the table containing only protocol constants, as
attacker guesses).
The function returns, as an out-parameter, a claim c on the global crypto-
graphic state, that guarantees that it can never be opened during execution. So
its invariants are maintained even in the presence of interference from interleaved
threads, which are guaranteed to preserve the two-state invariants through all
atomic actions. Thus, the second sort of instrumentation in C′ passes the claim
c as ghost parameter to each function and procedure call in C, in accord with
their contracts in RPCshim.h.
For example:
att run server(s (ghost c));
We also add an assertion before each function and procedure call. This
helps us explain why verification goes through. Let us say “pointer variable”
for the variables declared in D with pointer type. Preceding each procedure call
f(y) and function call x = f(y) in C′ we can assert a conjunction of the form
wrapped(x0)&& . . .&&wrapped(xj) where x0, . . . , xj are the pointer variables that
have been assigned up to this point. (We gloss over memory safety assertions
needed for bare string literals.) By induction on the length of C, we argue that
each of these assertions holds, and moreover the type invariants are maintained.
An assignment, say x = f(y, z, w);, satisfies the preconditions of f owing to
the added claim, the requirement that y, z, w were previously assigned, and
the assertion that y, z, w are all wrapped. By inspection of the contracts for
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each f in RPCshim.h (e.g., att hmacsha1() given above), that is all that is needed.
The postcondition of f ensures that results are wrapped, so in particular x is
wrapped at the next assertion (and the claim maintained).
Running VCC on RPCattack 0.c not only served to check the init() code used
in the proof but also as a sanity check on this Lemma. In fact, the added
intermediate assertions are not needed for VCC to verify the example attack
program.
Theorem 1. Assume ∅ ` crypto.c  crypto.h. For any attack program M.c
against the interface erase(RPCshim.h), the program System + RPCshim.c + M.c is
safe.
Proof. We have verified with VCC that:
crypto.h ` (RPChybrids.c + RPCprot.c + RPCshim.c) RPCshim.h
By assumption ∅ ` crypto.c crypto.h and Lemma 1 we get
∅ ` (crypto.c + RPChybrids.c + RPCprot.c + RPCshim.c) RPCshim.h
That is, we have ∅ ` (System + RPCshim.c)  RPCshim.h by definition of System.
By Lemma 2, since M.c is an attack program for erase(RPCshim.h), we get
RPCshim.h `M.c main.h. Hence by Lemma 1 we get
∅ ` (System + RPCshim.c + M.c) main.h
So by Assumption 1 the program System + RPCshim.c + M.c is safe.
Informal corollary: For all applications A verified against RPCprot.h and the
rest of the API (excluding RPCshim.h), A + RPCprot.c + RPChybrids.c + crypto.c is
safe in the presence of any active network attacker (under the symbolic model
of cryptography). The software stack shown in Section 1.3 is executable but its
real purpose is to show security for a different software stack, without RPCshim.c
and RPCattack 0.c but with additional application code that is verified to be
memory safe and to conform to the protocol API RPCprot.h.
8 Summary of Empirical Results
In this section, we summarize our experimental results on implementations of
RPC and of the variant of the Otway-Rees protocol presented by Abadi and
Needham [2].
8.1 Results
We prove authentication properties of the implementations using non-injective
correspondences, expressed as assertions on a log of events, by relying on weak
secrecy properties, which we prove formally as invariants of the log. The attacker
controls the network, can instantiate an unbounded number of principals, and
can run unbounded instances of each protocol role —but can never cause a
correspondence assertion to fail and can never break the secrecy invariants,
unless the Dolev-Yao assumption (no collisions or lucky guesses) has already
been violated. In particular, we prove the following properties about our sample
protocol implementations.
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8.1.1 RPC
Our implementation of RPC does not let the server reply to unwanted requests,
and does not let the client accept a reply that is not related to a previously sent
request. Moreover, their shared key remains secret unless either the client or
the server is compromised by the attacker.
8.1.2 Otway-Rees
The initiator and responder only accept replies from the trusted server that
contain a freshly generated key for their specific usage, and this key remains
secret unless either the initiator or the responder is compromised.
As both a side-effect and a requirement to use a general purpose verifier, we
also prove memory safety properties of our implementations. This can signifi-
cantly slow verification, especially in parts of the code that handle the building
of messages by catenation, and is a large part of the annotation burden.
8.2 Performance
Table 1 shows verification times, as well as lines of code (LoC) and lines of an-
notation (LoA) estimations for various implementation files, and offers a com-
parison of annotation burden and verification time between the original imple-
mentation of the methodology as described in [33] and the one described in this
paper, that leverages more recent VCC features and performance improvements.
Times are given as over-approximations of the verification time (on a mid-end
laptop), in seconds. The number of lines of annotation includes the function
contracts, but not earlier definitions. For example, when verifying a function in
hybrids.c, all definitions from symcrypt.h can be used but are not counted towards
the total. The shim and sample attack programs are verified, as part of the proof
of the security theorem, but they are not part of the protocol verification and
so are omitted here. However, the significant speedup observed on the protocol
code is also observable on the shim and attack code. The Otway-Rees shim
available online assumes, for simplicity, a special semantics for some function
calls, as the threads running the initiator and responder role should be able to
return a value to the attacker, which requires some more glue code in C. It is
possible to write and verify this glue code using VCC, but it makes the code
that much more complex to understand and is not relevant to the protocol’s
security.
The built-in support for induction in VCC, including the stronger type-
checking that comes with it, allows the verifier to heavily optimize the back-
ground axiomatization for the inductive types. It also allows a much more suc-
cinct and clear definition of the security model, leading to much smaller back-
ground axiomatizations. Additionally, the number of memory-safety-related
function contracts has been dramatically reduced by a recent overhaul of the
internal axiomatization of the memory model, leading to similar (if not better)
verification times with less annotations. On the other hand, a move by the VCC
team to a less specialised model of memory allocation (that previously could not
interfere with other threads) requires us to keep track much more precisely of
the claimed properties on the cryptographic state, increasing the number of
(boiler-plate) annotations required to verify the main protocol functions. Those
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Preliminary Version [33] Present Version
File/Function LoC LoA Time (s) LoA Time (s)
symcrypt.h - 50 ≤ 1 5 -
table.h - 50 ≤ 15 30 ≤ 1
RPCdefs.h - 250 ≤ 15 200 ≤ 5
hybrids.c 150 300 ≤ 300 200 ≤ 30
destruct() 20 40 ≤ 300 20 ≤ 5
hmacsha1() 20 20 ≤ 10 20 ≤ 5
RPCprot.c 130 80 ≤ 900 130 ≤ 60*
client() 40 20 ≤ 300 30 ≤ 30*
server() 40 10 ≤ 600 30 ≤ 30*
ORprot.c 300 100 ∼ 6000 100 ≤ 200*
initiator() 40 15 ≤ 300 18 ≤ 30*
responder() 100 100 ⊥2 30 ≤ 140*
server() 40 15 ∼ 1800 30 ≤ 40*
Table 1: Comparison showing changes in number of lines of annotation and im-
provements in verification times between a preliminary version of our system [33]
and the version of this article, for the same C implementations of Authenticated
RPC and Otway-Rees.
numbers still remain on the order of one line of annotation per line of code. At
the time of writing, the verification times marked with a * in Table 1 can only
be obtained by passing non-standard options to VCC (present in the source
archive’s Makefile). Verification times without this option still show significant
improvement over the previous figures.
So as to focus on verifying security properties, we simplified in the example
used several aspects of the implementation that were not relevant to symbolic
security and usually require extensive annotations: details of network operations
are ignored by the verifier (in particular, each principal is only given one single
channel to the attacker), and memory is not freed after use.
In a related publication [3], we verify a much more idiomatic C program for
a symmetric-encryption-based RPC protocol (RPC-enc), using an axiomatic
encoding of usages and logs in VCC, closer to the one presented in [33]. The
RPC-enc example is not presented in the table above as it was not studied in
the preliminary version of our method, and has not yet been ported over to the
current version.
9 Related Work on Protocol Code
We discussed the closely related tools Csur and ASPIER for C and some tools
for F# in Section 1. We discuss other work on verifying executable code of
security protocols.
Pistachio [58] verifies compliance of a C program with a rule-based specifi-
cation of the communication steps of a protocol. It proves conformance rather
2This was erroneously reported as a successful verification run in [33], due to a VCC bug
whereby success was reported when Z3 ran out of memory. The only affected result was a
post-condition regarding the fact that the involved principals were distinct, which did not
hold when the responder was compromised. In this version, we added a concrete check when
the responder receives the initial message, letting her detect the potential attack and close
the connection early.
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than specific security properties. DYC [42] is a C API for symbolic crypto-
graphic protocol messages which can be used to generate executable protocol
implementations, and also to generate constraints which can be fed to a con-
straint solver to search for attacks. Code is checked by model-checking a finite
state space rather than being fully verified.
In this paper, we present how a high-level security model can be expressed
as part of a C program. Conversely, one can extract a high-level model of the
implemented protocol. Symbolic execution of C code is a promising technique
for this purpose. Corin and Manzano [28] extend the KLEE symbolic execution
engine to represent the outcome of cryptographic algorithms symbolically, but
do not consider protocol code. Other recent work [4] extracts verifiable ProVerif
models by symbolic execution of C protocol code, on code similar to that of this
paper.
There are approaches for verifying implementations of security protocols in
other languages. Ju¨rjens [44] describes a specialist tool to transform a Java pro-
gram’s control-flow graph to a Dolev-Yao formalization in FOL which is verified
for security properties with automated theorem provers such as SPASS. O’Shea
[53] translates Java implementations into formal models in the LySa process
calculus so as to perform a security verification. The VerifiCard project uses
the ESC/Java2 static verifier to check conformance of JavaCard applications
to protocol models (e.g., [40]). Mukhamedov, Gordon, and Ryan [48] perform
a formal analysis of the implementation code of a reference implementation of
the TPM’s authorization and encrypted transport session protocols in F#, and
automatically translate it into executable C code.
Work on RCF, the concurrent lambda calculus underpinning F7, is directly
related. For example, Backes, Maffei and Unruh [9] provide conditions under
which symbolic security of programs in RCF using cryptographic idealizations
implies computational security using cryptographic algorithms. Also, Backes,
Hrit¸cu and Maffei [8] extend RCF with union and intersection types for the
verification of the source code of cryptographic-protocol implementations in
F#.
In recent work, Polikarpova and Moskal [56] show how the cryptographic
invariants methodology presented in the conference version of this paper, and
improved in this article, can be used to verify security properties of stateful
devices. They modify our approach slightly in two ways. First, they make use
of records and type invariants to define subsets of our Pub and Bytes predicates,
ensuring only that they are closed under the cryptographic destructors, and
modeling attacker actions explicitly, in a way similar to TAPS [23]. Second,
they rely on an abstract model of the device written and verified in the VCC
specification language, and which the C code is proved to refine in VCC.
More recently, researchers have focused on obtaining computational security
properties on implementations using techniques ranging from information-flow
analysis [45], to code extraction [20], to type systems and deductive verifica-
tion [17, 35, 32], to security-specfic tools and certified compilation [6]. However,
the computational model is outside the scope of the work presented here.
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10 Conclusion
We describe a method for guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove both
memory safety and authentication and weak secrecy properties of security pro-
tocols and their implementations. Still, our use of VCC leaves clear room for
improvement in terms of reducing verification times and the number of user-
supplied annotations. Our strategy of building on a general-purpose C verifier
aims to benefit from economies of scale, and in particular to benefit from future
improvements in C verification in general. This paper improves on the base-
line performance and generalizes the methods presented in [33], and outlines a
general way of describing classes of protocols by defining acceptable usages of
cryptographic primitives inductively. We encourage verification specialists to
take up the challenge, as some already did ([56]).
Some of our security annotations can be re-used. In particular, the hybrid
wrappers and their contracts need only be written once per cryptographic li-
brary, and can be used to verify multiple protocol implementations, as we have
done for RPC and Otway-Rees. The representation table is also entirely re-
usable. Moreover, we believe that some of the annotations (for example, the
log and inductive predicate definitions) may be automatically generated from a
high-level description of the protocol.
In future work we intend to adapt our foundations to obtain provably com-
putationally sound results with VCC. We have designed our contracts to corre-
spond to cryptographic assumptions; for example, encryptions give only confi-
dentiality and MACs give only integrity. The table structure and hybrid wrap-
pers introduced in Section 4 resemble some standard methods for computational
soundness, such as the dual interpretation of the interface in BPW [10], or the
hybrid wrappers used in [34]. We may also try more direct methods to ob-
tain computational security results, for example by using the idealized interface
from [34] and by assuming a computationally sound implementation (or linking
the C code against the F# implementation), or by extending the verifier with
probabilistic semantics for C, similar to the probabilistic semantics given to the
pWhile language in CertiCrypt [12].
Verification of symbolic security properties remains relevant, even without a
computational soundness result, as recent attacks on prominent protocols and
implementations could have been found by symbolic protocol verification. More-
over, some standard features of security protocols (such as sending encrypted
keys over the network) are hard to prove secure in the computational model,
but may be studied in symbolic models.
For highest assurance, the underlying libraries (crypto.c) would be verified, as
would any application code using the protocol library. Moreover, the C verifier
would be proved sound with respect to a semantics for which the compiler is
proved to be correct (as in the verified toolchain [7] built on CompCert [46]).
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A Inductive Definitions for Otway-Rees
As mentioned in the main text, we have also verified a variant of the Otway-Rees
key exchange protocol, described in the protocol narration below. a and b are
the parties establishing a session key, and s is a trusted server, assumed to have
a shared key Kp with every other principal p. Na and Nb are nonces, although
we do not check them for freshness, and Kab is a key, freshly generated by the
trusted server with the desired usage.
Additional example: the Otway-Rees key exchange protocol
a → b: a | b | Na
b → s: a | b | Na | Nb
s : Log(Initiator(a, Na, Kab, b))
s : Log(Responder(b, Nb, Kab, a))
s → b: SEnc(Ka, (a | b | Na | Kab)), SEnc(Kb, (a | b | Nb | Kab))
b : assert(Responder(b, Nb, Kab, a))
b → a: SEnc(Ka, (a | b | Na | Kab))
a : assert(Initiator(a, Na, Kab, b))
This appendix presents the corresponding inductive usage definitions, in-
cluding payload and compromise predicates. The usages are defined in such a
way that the freshly established shared key can be used to run the Authen-
ticated RPC protocol described in this paper between a and b. The full Coq
proofs and the verified protocol implementation in VCC are available online
(http://fdupress.net/files/journals/guiding/JCS-code.zip).
Coq definitions for terms and usages for Otway-Rees
Inductive term :=
| Literal (bs: bytes)
| Pair (t1 t2: term)
| Hmac (k m: term)
| SEnc (k p: term).
Inductive nonceUsage: Type :=.
Inductive hmacUsage: Type :=
| U SessionKey (a b: term).
Inductive sencUsage: Type :=
| U PrinKey (p: term).
Inductive usage :=
| AttackerGuess
| Nonce (nu: nonceUsage)
| HmacKey (hu: hmacUsage)
| SEncKey (su: sencUsage).
Inductive event :=
| New (l: term) (u: usage)
| Initiator (p np kpb b: term)
| Responder (p np kap a: term)
| Request (a b req: term)
| Response (a b req resp: term)
| Bad (a: term).
Note that the nonces Na and Nb are not given a nonce usage as they are sent
over the network completely unprotected, and could therefore be replaced with
any Low term by the adversary.
Payload and Compromise predicates for Session keys
Definition SessionKey (a b k: term) (L: log) :=
Logged (New k (HmacKey (U SessionKey a b))) L.
Definition SessionKeyComp (a b k: term) (L: log) :=
Logged (Bad a) L ∨
Logged (Bad b) L.
Definition SessionKeyPayload (a b k m: term) (L: log
) :=
(∃ req,
Requested m req ∧
Logged (Request a b req) L) ∨
(∃ req, ∃resp,
Responded m req resp ∧
Logged (Response a b req resp) L).
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Payload and Compromise predicates for Principal Keys
Definition PrinKey (p k: term) (L: log) :=
Logged (New k (SEncKey (U PrinKey p))) L.
Definition PrinKeyComp (p k: term) (L: log) :=
Logged (Bad p) L.
Definition Pair4 m a b c d :=
m = Pair a (Pair b (Pair c d)).
Definition PrinKeyPayload (p k m: term) (L: log) :=
(∃ b, ∃np, ∃kpb,
p <> b ∧
Pair4 m p b kpb np ∧
SessionKey p b kpb L ∧
Logged (Initiator p np kpb b) L) ∨
(∃ a, ∃np, ∃kap,
p <> a ∧
Pair4 m a p kap np ∧
SessionKey a p kap L ∧
Logged (Responder p np kap a) L).
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